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It is known that anti-social redistributive activities (rent seeking, tax evasion, corruption, 
violation of property rights, delay of socially beneficial reforms, etc) hurt the macroeconomy. 
But it is less known what is the role of government size as a determinant of such activities. 
We use data from 64 counties (both developed and developing) in 5-year periods over 1980-
2000. As a measure of anti-social activities, we use the ICRG index; as a measure of 
government size, we use the government share in GDP; and as a measure of government 
efficiency, we construct an index by following the methodology of Afonso, Schuknecht and 
Tanzi (2003). Our regressions show that what really matters to social incentives is the relation 
between size and efficiency. Specifically, while a larger size of government is bad for 
incentives when one ignores efficiency, the results change drastically when government 
efficiency is also taken into account. Only when our measure of size exceeds our measure of 
efficiency, larger public sectors are bad for incentives. By contrast, when efficiency exceeds 
size, larger public sectors are not bad; actually, in the case where efficiency is measured by 
government performance in the policy areas of administration, stabilization and infrastructure, 
larger public sectors significantly improve incentives. 
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1. Introduction   
 
Incentives motivate economic and social life. For many economists, economics is to a 
large extent a matter of “good” incentives.
1 In this paper, by good incentives we mean 
the involvement in socially productive activities as opposed to socially unproductive 
activities, legal or illegal, that aim at a redistributive struggle for a larger share of the 
national pie. In other words, by socially unproductive, or anti-social, activities we 
mean situations in which economic agents (e.g. social groups, professional 
associations, public sector unions, industrial associations, networks, or even single 
individuals) use their private time and resources to gain an advantage in dividing up 
the benefits of aggregate economic activity and appropriate other agents’ product and 
effort.
2   
In their search for private gain, anti-social agents reduce the pie that initiated 
the redistributive struggle in the first place. For instance, Olson (1982) argues that 
entrenched vested interests are a main cause for economic decline, while Rodrik 
(1999) points out that domestic social conflicts and redistributive struggles play a key 
role in understanding why growth rates lack persistence and why some countries have 
experienced a sharp decline in growth since the mid 1970s. In the end, even 
aggressive agents, that look as winners, may lose by finding themselves with a larger 
slice of a smaller pie. 
Anti-social redistributive activities (ASRA) can take a variety of forms.
3 For 
instance, they can take the form of rent-seeking competition for extra favors from the 
state, which benefit specific groups at the expense of others
4 (see e.g. Persson and 
Tabellini (2000, chapter 7), Mohtadi and Roe (1998, 2003), Alesina (1999), Mauro 
(2002) and Park et al. (2003)). Or they can take the form of a distributive struggle 
                                                           
1 See e.g. the examples in the book by Laffont and Martimort (2002).    
2 See Mueller (2003, chapters 3 and 29) for a survey of the literature on redistribution. Here, we focus 
on what Mueller calls “involuntary” redistribution, or “redistribution as taking”.  
3 Although different authors use different terms, they describe similar problems and use similar proxies. 
For instance, Knack and Keefer (1995) use the term “institutions”, Barro (1997) uses the term “rule of 
law”, Knack and Keefer (1997) use the term “social capital”, Hall and Jones (1999) use the term 
“social infrastructure”, and Zak and Knack (2001) use the term “trust”; on the other side of the coin, 
Rodrik (1999) uses the term “social conflict”. In this paper, we prefer to use the term “ASRA”. Note 
also that we will use the terms incentives, behavior and activities interchangeably.   
4 Rent seeking is the socially costly pursuit of a contestable prize, where the prize can take various 
forms (for surveys of rent seeking, see e.g. Drazen, 2000, chapters 8 and 10, and Mueller, 2003, chapter 
15). Usually it is the government that can create, increase and protect a rent. As a result, and due to the 
post-war expansion of government, fiscal rent seeking is a key way of redistributive politics. In this 
case, examples of rent seeking include lobbying for the provision of local public goods, obtaining 
contracts for the provision of public goods, securing public sector employment, getting extra fiscal 
transfers and tax exemptions, using the revenue from privatised public assets for the benefit of special 
interests like public sector unions, etc. This goes back to Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974).       2
among power groups, like trade unions and high executives (see e.g. Mueller (2003, 
chapter 20) for interest groups). Or they can take the form of non-adoption, delay or 
reversal of socially beneficial reforms and policy changes as vested interests preserve 
the status quo to keep extra rents (see e.g. Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Drazen 
(2000, chapter 10)). Or they can take the form of extraction from national natural 
resources for private benefit (see e.g. Leite and Weidmann (2002) and Grossman and 
Mendoza (2003)). Or, when there are trade impediments, they can take the form of 
higher prices as firms charge higher prices to increase their profit margins. Or they 
can take the form of shadow or underground economic activities (see e.g. Schneider 
and Enste (2000)). But ASRA can also take the form of illegal activities like tax 
evasion, corruption, criminal violations of property rights, smuggling or fraud (see 
e.g. Rose-Ackerman (1999) and Mueller (2003, chapter 16)). Finally, they can take 
the form of anti-social behavior in the form of incivility, disorder, nuisance and 
disrespect for public goods (see e.g. The Economist, September 13
th 2003, p. 36).  
ASRA are at best a zero-sum game. As Mueller (2003, p. 9) puts it, “if 
stealing, and guarding against it, detract A and B’s ability to produce corn and cattle, 
it becomes a negative-sum game”. Nevertheless, although such activities lead to 
socially inefficient outcomes, they can be privately rational. Utility-maximizing 
agents tradeoff personal benefits and costs expected from alternative uses of their time 
and resources.
5 In a decentralized (Nash) equilibrium, they may find it optimal to 
allocate a part of their time and resources to ASRA. However, the society would be 
better off (the national pie would be larger), if economic agents allocated their 
resources to socially productive activities. A larger national pie could in turn allow 
higher personal welfare. Thus, in most cases, there is a prisoners’ dilemma situation in 
the sense that everybody gets worse off.   
  But, although the human motivator is utility maximization (namely, self 
interest) in all societies, societies do differ in the way they channel self-interest. As 
Rose-Ackerman (1999, p. 2) points out, in some societies, self-interest is transmuted 
mainly into socially productive activities that lead to an efficient allocation of 
resources. In some other societies, by contrast, self-interest is transmuted mainly into 
socially unproductive activities that lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.   
This non-technical paper investigates the determinants of ASRA. Obviously, 
many factors can contribute to such activities ranging from fundamentals to incentive 
                                                           
5 Concerning the private costs of ASRA, lobbying, participating in strikes, paying campaign 
contributions to politicians, bribing, paying lawyers, hiring private security services, etc, are costly 
activities. For the social costs of ASRA, see below in Section 3.     3
schemes and time horizons. Here, the focus will be on the role of the government 
sector, and in particular on the relation between size and efficiency of the government 
sector.
6  
There is a popular belief that governments, especially big-sized governments, 
are a main reason for poor incentives and anti-social redistributive activities. Rent 
seeking, corruption, tax evasion, moral hazard, etc are believed to be phenomena 
associated with high government spending, large tax burdens and heavy regulation. 
For instance, as Mueller (2003, p. 544) puts it, “it is tempting when thinking of this 
question (why has the underground sector grown so rapidly across all countries?) to 
seek an answer in the tremendous growth in government that has occurred since 
1960”. However, Scandinavian countries or Canada have large public sectors, yet they 
enjoy relatively top institutions and socially behaved citizens. Therefore, as Mueller 
also warns on the same page “linking up the size and growth of the government sector 
to the size of growth of the underground economies of the developed countries 
remains a challenging research task”.  
  We use data from 64 counties (both developed and developing) in 5-year 
averages over the period 1980-2000. As a measure of ASRA, we will follow usual 
practice by using the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) index. As a measure 
of government size, we will use the government share in GDP. As a measure of 
government efficiency, we will construct an index by following the methodology of 
Afonso et al. (2003) for OECD countries. This index measures the efficiency of the 
public sector of each country in reaching a range of objectives of government 
intervention. It is calculated as the ratio of performance indicators (output) by a 
measure of public expenditures related to those indicators (input), based on the 
assumption that the input is used to achieve that output. Thus, among other things, a 
contribution of our paper is to rank a relatively large group of countries according to 
their public sector efficiency, where the latter is measured by government 
                                                           
6 It is important to lay out a conceptual framework that provides the basis of our empirical work. In 
one-shot non-cooperative games, strategic complementarities can produce multiple, Pareto ranked, 
Nash equilibria (see e.g. Cooper and John (1988)). By strategic complementarities, we mean that 
private incentives depend positively on those of the groups we associate with. This implies that, if there 
are complementarities in anti-social activities (e.g. I tax evade, if the others tax evade), one may get 
equilibria with good incentives and equilibria with bad incentives depending on fundamentals (see e.g. 
Tirole (1996)). For instance, in models of rent seeking from state coffers, the probability of an 
equilibrium with rent seeking increases with the size of public sector and decreases with the degree of 
efficiency in this sector (see e.g. Mauro (2002) and Park et al. (2003)). This is the conceptual 
framework here. In turn, the standard results hold. For instance, if an economy is stuck in a bad 
equilibrium in the one-shot game, a cooperative outcome can be achieved via repetition.     4
performance in the policy areas of administration, stabilization, infrastructure and 
education.   
  Our main empirical findings are as follows. When one ignores efficiency, a 
larger size of government is bad for incentives. However, the results change 
drastically when efficiency is also taken into account. Our regressions show that only 
when our measure of size exceeds our measure of efficiency, larger public sectors are 
bad for incentives. By contrast, when efficiency exceeds size, larger public sectors are 
not bad; actually, in the case where efficiency is measured by government 
performance in the policy areas of administration, stabilization and infrastructure, 
larger public sectors significantly improve incentives. To give an illustrative example, 
a large public sector is good for incentives in a country like Canada or Malaysia, in 
which efficiency is also high. But a public sector of about the same size is bad for 
incentives in a country like Romania or Uruguay, where efficiency is low.  
  Therefore, our findings question the popular belief that large sizes per se are 
bad for incentives. Whether the effect of government size on incentives is positive or 
negative (or equivalently whether the government size is too small or too large) 
depends on the nexus between size and efficiency of the public sector. In other words, 
as it is the case in the literature relating government size to economic growth (see the 
literature initiated by Barro, 1990), the data reveal an inverted-U relationship between 
size and incentives. In principle, government intervention can have both positive and 
negative effects on incentives (see Section 4 below for details), so that countries 
should be located all along the curve. And this is what the data say.  
  Our findings are consistent with the warning of Levine and Renelt (1992, p. 
951) that “using simple expenditure data without accounting for government 
efficiency may yield inaccurate measures of the actual delivery of public services”. 
They are also consistent with Tanzi’s (1998, p. 566) intuition that “the way the state 
operates and carries its functions is far more important than the size of public sector 
activity measured in the traditional way”. Mueller (2003, p. 548) also believes that 
“both the size of government and the quality of its institutions appear to matter”.  
We will build our arguments in simple logical steps. We begin with measures 
of social incentives in Section 2. Section 3 reviews how economic performance is 
shaped by incentives. In Section 4, we search for the determinants of incentives by 
focusing on government size. A measure of government efficiency is constructed in 
Section 5. Section 6 presents the main findings by examining the size vis-à-vis 
efficiency mix. Section 7 concludes.     5
 
2. Measures of anti-social redistributive activities (ASRA)  
 
Anti-social redistributive activities (or their mirror image, socially productive 
activities) are hard to measure. Any empirical methodology can only utilize proxy 
variables, usually in the form of subjective indexes, which can hopefully provide 
adequate description of this type of activities. Several indexes have been proposed and 
used by the literature. In this section, we briefly present the most popular indexes and 
choose the one we are going to use.  
  Most studies use the IRIS dataset (version IRIS-3, obtained by 
countrydata.com) that contains annual values over 1982-1997, as constructed by 
Stephen Knack and the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland, from monthly 
ICRG data provided by Political Risk Services. This index includes five sub-indexes: 
“rule of law”, “risk of expropriation”, “corruption in government”, “risk of 
repudiation of government contracts” and “quality of bureaucracy”. A key advantage 
of this proxy is that it has a sufficiently long time-series dimension. This dataset has 
been used by e.g. Knack and Keefer (1995), Barro (1997), Mauro (1998), Rodrik 
(1999), Hall and Jones (1999), Olson et al. (2000), Persson et al. (2003) and Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin (2004). Note that some authors use this index as a flow variable (e.g. 
rent seeking, corruption, social behavior), while some others use it as a stock variable 
(e.g. quality of government institutions, social infrastructure, social capital). This 
conforms to our claim above that, at least from an empirical viewpoint, all these 
different names are effectively picking up the same thing, what we here call ASRA. 
There are other datasets available that can also provide proxies for ASRA. For 
instance, for corruption in government, most researchers use the CPI index as 
developed by Transparency International. This index has been used by e.g. Treisman 
(2000), Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson et al. (2003). It should be noted that 
the CPI and the ICRG indexes are highly correlated (see Treisman (2000, p. 411) and 
Persson et al. (2003, p. 967)). An alternative proxy for corruption, compiled by the 
organization Business International (BI), has been used by e.g. Mauro (1995) and 
Ades and Di Tella (1999). The BI index is also highly correlated with the CPI index 
(see e.g. Treisman (2000, p. 411)). Another measure of socially productive activities 
can be obtained from the Kaufmann et al. (2003) dataset on governance. This has 
been used by e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2003) and Persson et al. (2003). This index is 
also highly correlated with the CPI index (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2003, p.   6
57)). Finally, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) have used an index 
of social capital or trust obtained from the World Values Surveys.  
  In this paper, we will choose the most commonly used index, the ICRG. 
Although, like most related indexes, the ICRG index is centred on governance 
problems, it essentially captures anti-social symptoms in the society as a whole. For 
instance, corruption of government officials is highly correlated with ASRA in 
general. To measure ASRA, one could use the “rule of law” sub-index only. However, 
since there are very strong correlations among the five sub-indexes, we will follow 
usual practice by using the sum of all five sub-indexes included in the ICRG index.    
 
3. Anti-social redistributive activities (ASRA) hurt the macroeconomy    
 
It is recognized that ASRA are associated with worse macroeconomic performance. 
This section will briefly review the main results and empirical findings of the 
literature.  
  ASRA lead to a smaller national pie, so that competing social groups can end 
up with a larger slice of a smaller pie. The pie gets smaller because national resources 
are misallocated.
7 For instance, rent seeking misallocates the talent of people, absorbs 
labor and so reduces output. Or the tax imposed by the rent-seeking sector on the 
productive sector can reduce incentives to produce. Or social conflict can discourage 
innovation. Or low trust environments increase transaction costs and reduce 
investment. Or collected tax revenues can be used for the benefit of special interests at 
the expense of public goods and social infrastructure so that the government cannot 
play its useful Musgravian role.   
  There is a lot of econometric work confirming that ASRA hurt the 
macroeconomy. Here we list the most influential empirical papers. Mauro (1995) uses 
the Business International index of corruption and finds that corruption has a negative 
effect on growth and private investment. Knack and Keefer (1995) use the ICRG 
index, as a measure of the quality of institutions, and document a positive effect on 
growth and private investment in cross-country regressions. The same index has been 
                                                           
7 Theorists have always attributed economic progress to the quality of institutions in a society (see e.g. 
the early work by Olson (1982) and North (1990)). Recent theoretical work has also shown how non-
cooperative behavior generates a destructive redistributive struggle over national wealth that leads to 
poor macro outcomes. See e.g. Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Lane and Tornell (1996), Mohtadi and 
Roe (1998, 2003), Tornell and Lane (1999), Mauro (2002), Park and  Philippopoulos (2003) and Park 
et al. (2003); see also Drazen (2000, chapters 10 and 11) for a survey of most of this literature. For 
surveys of the macro effects of corruption and anti-social activities in general, see e.g. Knack and   7
repeatedly used in growth regressions (see e.g. Barro (1997) and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (2004, chapter 12) who call the index “rule of law”) and is always found to be 
important for growth. Hall and Jones (1999) provide evidence that growth-promoting 
factors, like physical and human capital formation as well as productivity, are 
negatively affected by bad social infrastructure as measured by the ICRG index. 
Rodrik (1999) attributes growth collapses and inability to cope with external shocks to 
insufficient social infrastructure, which is the result of latent social conflicts and poor 
governmental institutions with the latter measured by the ICRG index. Olson et al. 
(2000) also use the ICRG index, as a measure of the quality of governance, to show 
that it is important in explaining differences in productivity growth among countries. 
Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) find that social trust is important 
to growth. There is also a lot of evidence that anti-social activities distort fiscal policy 
decisions.
8  
We sum up. Social cooperation and cohesion are engines of growth. Since this 
is already well established in the empirical literature, we do not provide our own 
evidence (however, results are available upon request).   
 
4. The fiscal size of government as a determinant of ASRA   
 
Given the importance of anti-social redistributive activities (ASRA) for 
macroeconomic outcomes, it is necessary to search for their determinants. The 
empirical literature has already identified several factors that cause ASRA.
9 These 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Keefer (1997, section II) and Tanzi (1998, pp. 578-586). For intuitive papers on rent seeking and their 
harmful effects, see Baumol (1990) and Murphy et al. (1991).   
8 ASRA distort the composition of government expenditure and taxation. In particular, Mauro (1998) 
uses the ICRG index as a proxy for rent seeking and provides evidence that this is resulting in a 
reallocation of government resources from areas that do not leave much room for extraction (e.g. 
education) into areas that allow for corruption (e.g. defence) (see also Gupta et al. (2001a, 2001b)). 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) show that high corruption (measured by the ICRG index) is associated with 
high public investment (because political corruption is often tied to capital projects) but low operation 
and maintenance expenditure and poor quality of infrastructure. Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) and Ghura 
(2002) provide evidence that higher corruption is associated with lower tax revenues.   
9 For rich studies see e.g. La Porta et al. (1999), Treisman (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, 
chapter 3). Commonly proposed determinants of anti-social activities include e.g. ethnic tensions, 
democracy, openness and inequality. Ethnic tensions result in social conflict and this exacerbates anti-
social activities and hurts growth (see e.g. Easterly and Levine (1997), Mauro (1995), La Porta et al. 
(1999), Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3) and Treisman (2000)). The quality of democracy 
increases transparency and reduces corruption and illegal activities (see e.g. Treisman (2000), Paldam 
(2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3)). Openness has ambiguous effects (see e.g. Tanzi 
(1998)). On the one hand, it can reduce rent seeking because it removes controls (e.g. tariffs, import 
quotas) that create the possibility of monopoly rents; on the other hand, it can result in a redistribution 
of corruption, as new interest groups become more powerful by the new developments. The empirical 
evidence so far seems to suggest that more open economies improve incentives (see e.g. Ades and Di 
Tella (1999), Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3) and Treisman (2000)). Finally, income inequality   8
factors include government policies.
10 Concerning government policies, the focus has 
been on two things. First, the beneficial effects of targeted policies, like education and 
redistribution.
11 Second, the adverse effects of regulations, since heavy regulation and 
government intervention can push agents to rent seeking, tax evasion, shadow 
economic activities, etc.
12 But there is relatively little evidence on the role of the fiscal 
size of the government sector, anyhow this size is measured.
13 This is surprising 
because it is widely believed that economic performance - and the quality of 
incentives is an important indicator of economic performance - correlates 
systematically with the fiscal size of the government sector.  
  But it is better to take things in turn. In principle, the effect of the fiscal size of 
government on the quality of private incentives is ambiguous. On the one hand, 
government intervention can improve incentives. For instance, governments can 
enforce the law by financing activities like police, courts and prisons; they can 
educate people the benefits of trust, ethics, social cohesion and cooperation; they can 
redistribute income and thus create opportunities and reduce social conflict; they can 
build schools and pay the salaries of teachers. On the other hand, there is the counter-
argument that government intervention, not only requires higher taxes, but also 
pushes self-interested individuals further away from socially productive to 
unproductive activities. For instance, large public sectors can lead to tax evasion; they 
can foster corruption; they generate both rents and rent-seeking behavior; they cause 
                                                                                                                                                                      
also results in social conflicts and anti-social activities (see e.g. Rodrik (1999), Keefer and Knack 
(2002) and Paldam (2002), who associate measures of income inequality with corruption).  
10 Government policies have always been considered to be important in shaping social behavior. For 
instance, Tanzi (1998, p. 565) argues that “corruption is generally connected with the activities of the 
state and especially with the monopoly and discretionary power of the state”. Olson et al. (2000, p. 
343) point out that “the structure of incentives is given by a country’s institutions and economic 
policies and thus by its government”. In Mueller (2003, p. 539), “taxes and other forms of government 
intervention and regulation can … affect the choice between conducting an activity in the legitimate 
economy and conducting it in the underground economy”. Alesina (1999) argues similarly when he 
compares big public sectors in developed economies to small public sectors in developing economies. 
11 For instance, Van Rijckeghem and Weder (2001) provide evidence that civil-service wages relative 
to manufacturing wages reduce corruption (however see also Treisman (2000) and La Porta et al. 
(1999) on this). Ades and Di Tella (1999) and Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3), among many 
others, use measures of school enrolment as potential determinants of less corruption.  
12 Johnson et al. (1998) relate the size of underground economy to indexes of the burden of regulation, 
taxation and corruption in a sample of 49 economies. Schneider and Enste (2000) review the literature 
that provides evidence that higher tax and social security contributions, as well as heavier regulation, 
cause shadow economic activities. Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) and Paldam (2002) use the “Economic 
Freedom of the World” index, developed by the Frasier Institute, while Treisman (2000) uses an index 
of state interference as constructed by the Institute for Management Development at Lausanne, to 
investigate the impact of economic freedom (or its mirror image, government regulations) on 
corruption.  
13 Exceptions include e.g. Goel and Nelson (1998) who find that corruption at the state level in the US 
increases with the fiscal size of state governments, and La Porta et al. (1999) who present cross-country 
correlations between various measures of the fiscal size of government and various proxies of rent 
seeking, and find (unexpectedly) an inverse relation.   9
moral hazard behavior. Therefore, as always with government intervention, there 
should be a tradeoff in the size of government, which implies that private incentives 
(and economic performance in general) follow an inverted-U pattern with the size. 
When the size is too small, a bigger size should improve incentives. Beyond a critical 
size, the distorting effects dominate and a bigger size should be bad for incentives.
14  
  When we go to the “real world”, a popular belief among economists is that in 
most countries (especially the developed ones) the costs outweigh the benefits so that, 
other things equal, countries with big governments perform worse than countries with 
small governments. For instance, Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, 2000) provide 
correlations that, in industrial countries, countries with small governments perform 
better than countries with big governments in terms of several socioeconomic 
indicators. As said above, this belief is particularly popular when the performance 
indicator is private incentives (tax evasion, corruption, rent seeking, moral hazard, etc, 
are believed to be phenomena especially associated with big-sized governments).    
  We sum up. The size of government is expected to be a key determinant of 
anti-social redistributive activities. We now look at the data.  
 
Preliminary econometric evidence 
To examine empirically the above conjectures, we use a pooled cross section of data 
for 64 counties (both developed and developing). We take 5-year averages for all 
variables over four time-periods, 1980-1985, 1985-1990, 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. 
Thus, ideally, we have four observations for each country. But there are missing 
observations for some countries in certain time periods, so that we end up with a total 
of 162 observations.
15  
  As a measure of anti-social redistributive activities, we will use the ICRG 
index described in Section 2 above, with higher scores denoting better social 
behavior. The ICRG index will be regressed on a selective small number of 
commonly-used explanatory variables (e.g. ethnic divisions, democracy and 
openness), plus the key variable in our study which is the government size. As a 
measure of government size, we will use the variable government share in GDP, 
                                                           
14 Tradeoffs between macro outcomes and the size of public sector are well studied (see e.g. Barro’s 
(1990) well-known growth model and the review of the empirical literature in Mueller (2003, chapter 
23)). But tradeoffs between private incentives and government size are less studied.   
15 For what we do in this section, we can collect data from 108 countries. However, the main constraint 
to the data is the construction of a measure of government efficiency described in Section 5 below. We 
therefore prefer to use the same sample (64 countries) throughout the paper. We report that the results 
reported in this section do not change if we use the bigger sample of 108 countries.    10
which is obtained from the Penn World Tables, version 6.1 (Heston et al., 2002).
16 As 
a measure of ethnic divisions, we will use the variable ethnic tensions provided by the 
IRIS dataset.
17 Democracy will be measured by the Gastil Index developed by the 
Freedom House. To measure openness, we will use the variable openness from the 
Penn World Tables defined as imports plus exports over GDP in constant prices. All 
these variables will be averaged over the four 5-year periods. Since historical or 
geographical effects can still be important even after controlling for the above factors, 
we will follow usual practice by adding a set of regional dummies for the countries 
located in East Asia,  Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, as well as for the 
Transition Economies.  
  Estimation of a regression for the ICRG index by fixed effects would not be 
informative in this sample, as there are several countries that have only one 
observation, which implies that they would have to be dropped. In addition, restricting 
the analysis to the within dimension of the data, would result in losing all cross-
country variation, and therefore our study would not be comparable to the relevant 
literature which has focused on cross-national differences. We therefore opt to 
estimate our regressions by pooled OLS after making two corrections (on the use of 
OLS techniques with panel data, see e.g. Wooldridge (2002, chapter 7)). First, we 
introduce a set of time dummies so as to control for possible time effects that appear 
to be common in all countries. We thus include a dummy for the 1985-1990 period 
(denoted as D1985), a dummy for 1990-1995 period (denoted as D1990) and a 
dummy for the 1995-2000 period (denoted as D1995). Second, we report standard 
errors that are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 
  The results of our basic regression are presented in column 1 of Table 1. The 
government size (as measured by gov. share) has a significantly negative effect on the 
                                                           
16 The fiscal size of government can be measured by government spending, tax revenue and the budget 
balance, all as shares of GDP (see e.g. Tanzi and Zee, 1997, and Persson and Tabellini, 2003). 
However, the tax revenue-to-GDP ratio is a problematic measure mainly because of tax evasion 
problems; this problem gets particularly acute when we examine social behavior since anti-social 
activities and tax evasion are correlated. The same can be said about the budget-to-GDP ratio since it 
includes tax revenues. We will therefore use common measures of government spending (as in the 
empirical growth literature). In this case, our primary measure will be the government share in GDP. 
This is government consumption expenditures to GDP and includes spending on goods and services 
like education and health (e.g. the salaries of professors and doctors and spending on non-capital 
goods), national defense, public administration, police and the judiciary system. These variables are 
close to the spirit of our paper. Nevertheless, we will also report results with more general measures of 
government spending, like the ratio of total government expenditures to GDP (available from World 
Development Indicators, WDI) that also includes public investment, transfers and interest payments on 
public debt. See below for further details.   
17 In cross-national analyses, Mauro (1995), Easterly and Levine (1997), Rodrik (1999), Treisman 
(2000) and Persson and Tabelini (2003, chapter 3) use an index of ethno linguistic fractionalization in   11
ICRG index, supporting the popular belief that, on average, large governments are bad 
for private incentives. The rest of the variables exert their expected effects. 
Specifically, the results confirm the positive effect of democracy and the adverse 
effect of ethnic tensions. Openness is not significant (see above for explanations). 
Concerning the regional dummies, the transition economies, East Asian countries and 
especially Latin American countries are associated with worse incentives. Also, the 
time dummies make a strong case that the 1990s have been a much better decade than 
the 1980s. It should be pointed out that this set of explanatory variables is explaining 
about 76% of the variation of the ICRG index.
18  
  Summing up this section, there is evidence that private incentives are 
negatively affected by the size of government. A key message of our paper is that this 
result, although popular, is missing an important point. Whether the effect of 
government size on incentives is positive or negative (or equivalently whether the 
government size is too small or too large) should depend explicitly on the nexus 
between size and efficiency of the public sector (see also e.g. Levine and Renelt 
(1992)). To put it differently, since government activity can have both positive and 
negative effects on incentives, both possibilities should be detected by the data so that 
countries are located all along a Laffer-type curve. Therefore, in what follows we try 
to go a bit deeper by taking account of government efficiency. But to do so, we first 
need a measure of government efficiency.   
 
5. A measure of government efficiency  
 
To measure government efficiency, we use the methodology developed by Afonso et 
al. (2003). We will construct sub-indices of relative Public Sector Efficiency (PSE) in 
certain policy areas in each country and each time period, and then take the average of 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the early sixties as a proxy for ethnic tensions. Here, we prefer the IRIS index (also used by e.g. Keefer 
and Knack, 2002) because it is available for more countries and more time periods.  
18 Two remarks: First, we have alternatively used total government expenditures-to-GDP as a measure 
of government size but it is not significant. We believe this is because this measure includes transfers 
and interest payments, where the former has several effects on incentives that work in different 
directions, and the latter is predetermined and thus too inflexible to affect social behavior. We thus 
believe that the government share in GDP is more appropriate for what we do here. Second, the results 
are affected if we include per capita GDP as an explanatory variable. In particular, most of the other 
regressors lose about half of their estimated effect on the ICRG index and their estimated standard 
errors get higher, while the coefficient of gov. share gets insignificant  (for similar results, see La Porta 
et al. (1999) although in a study without government size; Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 3), 
when they control for per capita income, also do not find significant effects of democracy, ethnic 
tensions or regional dummies on rent seeking). This is because the level of per capita income is a 
strong indicator of economic development; it is therefore highly correlated with (and thus absorbing the   12
these sub-indices to obtain an index of aggregate government efficiency in each 
country and each time period.  
  Afonso et al. have constructed such PSEs in seven policy areas for OECD 
countries over the eighties and nineties. Here, we will focus on four policy areas 
(education, administration, infrastructure and stabilization) for 64 countries, both 
industrialized and developing, and four 5-year time-periods, over 1980-2000 
(obviously, due to data availability, there is a trade-off between the number of 
countries and the number of policy areas). Note that we keep only those observations 
for which indexes of government efficiency in all four areas are available. 
  The basic insight in the methodology of Afonso et al. is to compare the 
performance of government in certain areas of economic activity (where these areas 
are directly influenced by government intervention) to the associated expenditures 
that the government allocates in order to achieve this particular performance. Thus, to 
construct a PSE index, we need a measure of Public Sector Performance (PSP) and a 
measure of the associated Public Sector Expenditure (PEX) for each country in each 
policy area in each time period. Then, the PSE will be the ratio of PSP to PEX.
19  
  In the policy area of education, the PSP can be measured by the variable 
Secondary School Enrollment, while the associated PEX is the average of the variable 
Public Spending in Education as a percentage of GDP (both variables are available 
from the World Development Indicators, WDI), where we use the end of period 
values (or the closest to the end available) of Secondary School Enrollment.
20 The 
resulting PSE is then a measure of government efficiency in the policy area of 
education.   
  In the policy area of administration, the PSP is measured by the end of period 
values of the variables Corruption in Government and Bureaucratic Quality (both 
obtained from the IRIS-3 dataset)
21 with higher scores denoting better outcomes, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
effect of) policies (e.g. the share of government in GDP, or the degree of openness) and other 
institutional factors (e.g. the measures of democracy, ethnic tensions, or regional dummies).    
19 Afonso et al. have focused on OECD countries, where the available data cover both government 
performance and the associated public expenditure. Although we have tried to follow Afonso et al. in 
the choice of policy areas and variables used, the construction of such a rich PSE for a broader group of 
countries runs into data limitations, especially when looking for decomposed public expenditure data. 
Thus, some deviations from the variables used by Afonso et al. are inevitable. Nevertheless, the 
variables used here are the same in spirit.  
20 Afonso et al. (2003) use the same PEX, but they also include a measure of the quality of education 
when they construct the PSP. See below for further details.  
21 Afonso et al. (2003) have used very similar variables (measures of corruption, red tape, quality of 
judiciary and shadow economy). We prefer the IRIS-3 indices simply because they are available for the 
counties and time period we work with.    13
while the PSE is obtained as in Afonso et al. (2003) by dividing this variable by the 
average public spending on goods and services (available from WDI).   
In the policy area of infrastructure, the PSP is measured by the average of the 
variable Diesel Locomotives in Use as a percentage of total locomotives, and the 
average of the inverse of Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses (both 
variables are available from WDI). These measures are also used in Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1998) as indicators of the quality of infrastructure. A problem here is that 
the relevant PEX for infrastructure quality, which has been used by Afonso et al. for 
the OECD countries, is not available for the larger group of countries we work with. 
We therefore choose to use Total Government Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP) 
for PEX (this is also available from WDI), again averaged over the 5-year period.  
  Finally, in the policy area of stabilization, the PSP is measured by the average 
of the inverse of the variables Inflation Rate and Unemployment Rate (obtained from 
WDI), while the relevant PSE is calculated by dividing this PSP by Total Government 
Expenditure (as a percentage of GDP), averaged over the 5-year period. Afonso et al. 
also use total government spending as a measure of the expenditures of the public 
sector that are associated with stabilization and economic performance indicators, 
such as inflation and unemployment.   
  To make the above PSP and PEX measures (expressed in different units of 
measurement) comparable across countries, we follow Afonso et al. by expressing 
each country’s PSP and PEX relative to the average PSP and PEX of all countries in 
each period, and this is done for all periods and for all four indexes. In other words, 
each country’s PSP and PEX are expressed as percentages of the respective average 
(normalized to be 100), and in turn the PSE is obtained as the ratio of these relative 
PSP and PEX.
22 Therefore, the resulting PSE is an index that measures the efficiency 
of a country relative to other countries in each period in a particular policy area. The 
larger the value, the more efficient the country is. This is the notion of relative 
efficiency in Afonso et al.  
  Table 2 reports the relative PSEs in the four policy areas over the most recent 
time-period, 1995-2000, for the 52 countries for which data are available for this time 
                                                           
22 Since the averages of PSP and PEX are both normalized to be 100, the resulting PSE has an average 
around 100 (specifically, the PSEs in education and stabilization have an average of about 110, 
whereas the PSEs in infrastructure and administration have an average of about 125). For instance, a 
number of 73 for the PSE in education in Algeria over 1985-1990 means that Algeria scores 73, when 
all the countries in this time period score on average 110 in the policy area of education.      14
period.
23 In turn, the first column in Table 3 reports the aggregate (relative) efficiency 
of government in each country over 1995-2000, obtained as the simple average of the 
four (relative) sub-indices in Table 2. The numbers in parentheses in the same column 
indicate the ranking of countries according to government efficiency. With two 
striking exceptions (Argentina and Thailand) that score paradoxically high and are 
marked with a question mark, the ranking looks rather sensible at least to us (in our 
econometric work below, we will use both the whole sample and a sample that 
excludes those few countries marked with a question mark).
24 As expected, OECD 
countries get on average better scores. However, the ranking of countries according to 
government efficiency does not always follow their per capita income ranking; we 
report that the correlation between per capita GDP and the government efficiency 
index of each country is, in the whole sample, 20% only.  
  Of course, we have to be cautious. For instance, in rich countries, like Finland 
or Sweden, the cost of resources used for providing public education or capital is 
higher than in say Uruguay or Lebanon, and this may result in an overestimation of 
relative efficiency in the latter group of countries. Also, government performance in a 
certain policy area may be overestimated when private resources are used to 
complement government policy; this is especially the case of education in many 
countries (Greece is a clear example). Actually, concerning the PSE in education, we 
feel that it is less related to quality performance than the PSEs in the other three 
policy areas. For instance, government expenditure on schools, teacher salaries or 
computers does not automatically mean better quality of education.
25 Given these 
problems, we will alternatively use an index of government efficiency that excludes 
education, and it is thus the average of the PSEs in administration, infrastructure and 
stabilization only. This new index is reported in the first column of Table 4, where as 
before the numbers in parentheses indicate the relative ranking of countries. Again, 
Argentina and Thailand score paradoxically high and are marked with a question 
                                                           
23 Results for the previous three time-periods are not reported so as to save on space. See Angelopoulos 
(2005) for all time-periods.   
24 During the other time-periods not reported here, Indonesia, Paraguay and Philippines also score 
paradoxically high. Thus, Argentina, Thailand, Indonesia, Paraguay and Philippines are listed as 
countries with a question mark.   
25 This is one of the reasons that Afonso et al. (2003) include test outcomes when they calculate the 
PSP in education. On the importance of the quality of education, see also e.g. Hanushek and Kimko 
(2000). Unfortunately, such data are not available for the countries and especially the time period 
covered in our sample.     15
mark (in our econometric work below, we will use both the whole sample and a 
sample that excludes those few countries marked with a question mark).
 26 
  Summing up, the main advantage of the Afonso et al. (2003) methodology is 
its simplicity and logical coherence, which allow a meaningful comparison across 
countries. Its main weakness is that strong assumptions have to be made in order to 
calculate such a composite index. Of course, if one wants to focus on OECD countries 
only, for which more detailed data are available, it is possible to construct more 
sophisticated measures (for a critical assessment of different measures of public sector 
efficiency, see Afonso et al. (2003), Afonso (2004) and the special issue of European 
Economy, no. 3, 2004, on “Public finances in EMU 2004”).  
 
6. Taking account of government efficiency and an inverted-U link  
 
This section addresses the main question posed in the paper: does the size effect 
depend on the relation between size and efficiency?   
  We start by simply adding government efficiency as a regressor into the 
simple regression of column 1 in Table 1.
27 The new results (reported in column 2 of 
the same table) show that the coefficient on government size remains significantly 
negative. Thus, by just adding government efficiency does not change anything.   
  We therefore move on to the main task, which is the investigation of whether 
there is an inverted-U pattern between government size and incentives depending on 
the size-efficiency mix. To do so, we will work in two steps. In the first step, we will 
classify countries into two groups: those whose relative size is bigger than their 
relative efficiency (we call them inefficient governments), and those in which the 
opposite is true (we call them efficient governments). In the second step, we will 
examine whether the effect of government size on incentives differs depending on the 
group. Thus, the difference from the simple regressions in Table 1, is that now we 
classify countries according to whether they have efficient or inefficient public 
sectors.  
The first subsection below will use the aggregate measure of government 
efficiency (the one reported in column 1 of Table 3), while the next subsection will 
                                                           
26 During the other time-periods not reported here, Panama, Paraguay and Philippines also score 
paradoxically high. Thus, Argentina, Thailand, Panama, Paraguay and Philippines are now listed as 
countries with a question mark.      
27 In this regression, as government efficiency we use the aggregate index reported in column 1 of 
Table 3. The results do not change if we use instead the less general index of government efficiency 
that excludes the PSE in education and is reported in column 1 of Table 4.    16
report results with the measure of government efficiency that excludes education 
performance (the one reported in column 1 of Table 4).    
 
Using the aggregate index of government efficiency  
Consider the first step. Relative government efficiencies are reported in column 1 of 
Table 3, while government sizes are reported in column 2 of the same Table (again we 
report results for the 1995-2000 period only). In column 3, we express each country’s 
government size relative to the average government size in the sample. Then, 
whenever the number in column 3 exceeds the number in column 1, a government is 
called inefficient, and vice versa. Note that since each country’s measures of PSP, 
PEX and government size are relative to their respective averages, these comparisons 
make sense. Take for example the first country in the list, Algeria: The government 
share in GDP is 25.9% (column 2 in Table 3), which implies a relative size of 161.8 
(this is relative to the average which is 100). Since the relative efficiency of its public 
sector is only 45.5 (column 1 in Table 3), Algeria is classified as having an inefficient 
public sector. In turn, column 4 of Table 3 denotes countries as I (inefficient) or E 
(efficient) depending on whether the number in column 3 minus the number in 
column 1 is positive or negative.
28 It is worth pointing out that by following this rule 
of classification about 60% of the countries are classified as being efficient in the 
whole sample (four 5-year time periods). For the period 1995-2000 reported here, the 
percentage of efficient governments is higher. Thus, there is an improvement in the 
nineties compared to the eighties. This is also evident from the high significance of 
the dummies for the nineties in our regressions. 
The regression results of the second step are reported in Table 5. Column 1 
shows that, in the group of inefficient governments, the government size (gov. share 
in GDP) significantly distorts social behavior at 5% level. By contrast, in the group of 
efficient governments, the size effect is not significant. Thus, the data reveal a 
difference between the two groups, although ideally we would like the size effect of 
efficient governments to be significantly positive (but see below). Notice that, since 
we have included the efficiency index as a regressor, these effects are net of any direct 
                                                           
28 Two remarks here: First, although most of the countries with efficient governments also have small 
governments, the two classifications do not coincide. For example, Malaysia, Canada, Chile, 
Argentina, Cyprus and Colombia, at certain time periods, have public sectors around, or larger than, the 
average and yet they are classified as having efficient governments. India, on the other hand, although 
scores well in terms of efficiency, it has a very big public sector so it is eventually classified as 
inefficient (I). We report that the correlation between government size and government efficiency is –
0.28 only. Second, the OECD economies are not always classified as having efficient governments. For   17
effects that efficiency might have on incentives. In particular, in both groups, the 
effect of efficiency is positive although not significant (but see below). The effects of 
all other variables on the ICRG index make sense and remain as in Table 1.  
  There are several concerns regarding the above regression. First, it is possible 
that the administration efficiency sub-index is endogenous because the construction of 
the PSP in administration uses data also included in the ICRG index (see Section 5). 
To check that our results do not depend on this, we ignore the policy area of 
administration and take instead the average of the other three sub-indices (education, 
stabilization and infrastructure) to construct an index of government efficiency. Then, 
working as above and dividing governments into efficient and inefficient according to 
the new index, we get the results reported in column 2 of Table 5. The results are very 
similar to those in column 1, so that the inclusion of administration in the index of 
government efficiency does not seem to cause any important biases. We will therefore 
continue to use the general index unless said otherwise.  
A second concern is the inclusion of those countries whose government 
efficiency scores looked paradoxical, at least to us. To make sure that the results do 
not depend on the inclusion of those observations, we omit these countries (defined in 
footnote 24 above). We then get the results reported in column 3 of Table 5. The 
previous results remain robust. Actually, the results become more sensible, in the 
sense that the efficiency indices in both groups get significantly positive.  
Third, there might be a potential problem with countries for which the 
difference (between size and efficiency) is small. A blind application of our 
classification rule to these countries implies that some of them have been only 
marginally classified as efficient or inefficient since their measures of size and 
efficiency are very close to each other. A way to overcome this problem is to classify 
public sectors in three groups: efficient (E), inefficient (I) and non-classified (N) (see 
column 5 of Table 3), where the N-group consists of counties whose efficiency is 
close (from above or below) to their size.
29 The regression reported in column 4 of 
Table 5 follows this new classification. The main results again do not change (we also 
report that results are not sensitive to the omission of those countries mentioned in 
footnote 24).    
                                                                                                                                                                      
example, Belgium 1980-1995, Ireland 1980-1990, Denmark 1980-1990, Portugal 1985-1995, Sweden 
1985-1995 and the Netherlands 1980-1985 are classified as inefficient.   
29 As N-governments, we define those in which the difference between relative efficiency and relative 
size lies in the interval (-15, +15); this amounts to about 18% of the observations in the sample. The 
rest of the countries exhibit differences far from this interval.    18
 
Using the index of government efficiency that excludes performance in education 
We now work as in the previous subsection but we use the measure of government 
efficiency that excludes the PSE in the area of education. In the first step, we again 
divide governments into efficient and inefficient. Whenever the number in column 2 
of Table 4 exceeds the number in column 1 of the same Table, the government is 
called inefficient, and vice versa. The new classification of countries into efficient (E) 
and inefficient (I) appears in column 3 of Table 4.  
  The regression results of the second step are reported in Table 6. The 
regression in column 1 shows that in the group of inefficient governments, the 
government size significantly distorts social behavior at the 5% level, while in the 
group of efficient governments, the effect of the size is positive although not 
significant. All other results remain as in column 1 of Table 5 (we also report that 
these results do not change if we drop the administration index as we did in the 
previous subsection).  
In the regression reported in column 2 of Table 6, we omit those countries 
whose efficiency scores looked paradoxical, at least to us (defined in footnote 26 
above). Now both the negative and positive effects are significant at 10% level. Thus, 
in the group of inefficient governments, the government size distorts social behavior, 
while, in the group of efficient governments, the government size improves social 
behavior. We therefore get a significant U-inverted pattern. Also notice that 
government efficiency exerts a significantly positive effect at 5% in both groups of 
countries. The other results are not affected. This is a good regression.     
In the regression in column 3 of Table 6, as we did in the previous subsection, 
we classify public sectors in three groups: efficient (E), inefficient (I) and non-
classified (N), where the N-group consists of counties whose efficiency is close (from 
above or below) to their size.
30 This classification appears in column 4 of Table 4. The 
resulting regression in column 3 of Table 6 shows that the size effect in the I-countries 
is significantly negative at 10%, while the size effect in the two other groups is not 
significant. However, results get better when we omit the same problematic countries 
we omitted in column 2 above. The new results, reported in column 4 of Table 6, 
reveal that the size effect in the I-countries remains significantly negative at 10%, 
                                                           
30 As N-governments, we again define those in which the difference between relative efficiency and 
relative size lies in the interval (-15, +15); this amounts to about 16% of the observations in the sample.   19
while the size effect in the E-countries gets significantly positive at 5%, and the size 
effect in the N-countries is insignificant as expected. This is again a good regression.     
  Summing up this section, the data indicate that private incentives follow an 
inverted-U pattern with government size. These results are clearer when one focuses 
on the policy areas of administration, infrastructure and stabilization.  
 
7. Conclusions  
 
We focused on the role of government in shaping anti-social redistributive incentives. 
To do so, we constructed an index of government efficiency by following the 
methodology of Afonso et al. (2003). The main finding is that social behavior follows 
an inverted-U pattern with government size, where the size effect on behavior 
depends on the relation between size and efficiency in the public sector.   
Our findings can also explain the correlations in Tanzi and Schuknecht (1997, 
2000) who show that countries with small-sized governments perform better. Here we 
showed that when the size is small relative to efficiency, social incentives improve 
with the size; and, obviously, this is more possible to happen when the size is small. 
But we explained something beyond this. Small per se is not beautiful. What matters 
to incentives, and hence to the macro-economy, is the relation between size and 
efficiency. Just shrinking the size of government will not necessarily reduce anti-
social problems like rent seeking, tax evasion and corruption.    
  We recognize that there are several limitations. For instance, we took the size 
of government, as well as its efficiency, as given. But government sizes, in particular, 
depend on a number of politico-economy factors varying from demographics to 
electoral cycles and special interests (see e.g. Persson and Tabellini (2003, chapter 
3)). Also, as admitted in Section 5, it would be useful to construct more detailed 
indexes of public sector efficiency depending on data availability. We however 
believe that our work is a contribution in the right direction and leave these issues to 
future research.      
Therefore, to reduce the possibility of getting stuck in a bad equilibrium, 
where agents behave anti-socially and destroy the national pie, we should improve the 
relation between size and efficiency in the public sector. This is not an easy task. It 
requires, among other things, the reallocation of government resources, and the 
effective and efficient use of those resources, towards identified and transparent 
strategic priorities. With respect to such priorities, we believe that the focus should be   20
on the link between fiscal policy and long-term growth (see also the policy 
conclusions in the special issue of European Economy, no. 3, 2004, on “Public 
finances in EMU 2004”). The design of fundamentals and institutions that can provide 
good incentives remains a big policy challenge.   
   21
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Notes: (i) The estimation method is OLS. (ii) There are 162 observations. (iii) Standard errors that are 
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and serial correlation are shown in parentheses. (iv) An asterisk 
denotes significance at 10%; two asterisks at 5%; three asterisks at 1%.  
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Table 2: Government efficiency in four areas of policy over 1995-2000 










Algeria 73.000  39.531  23.709  45.919 
Argentina 136.636  215.013  413.631  104.336 
Australia 121.831  199.940  146.158  160.321 
Austria 104.243  128.967  131.048  95.632 
Bulgaria 160.557  65.792  19.432  50.160 
Canada 112.985  337.331  174.088  163.146 
Chile 141.077  125.352  107.111  137.734 
Costa  Rica  61.251 64.098  94.138 121.553 
Cyprus 97.667  92.595  142.670  131.412 
Czech Republic  111.870  167.185  68.252  95.376 
Denmark 75.802  158.244  99.801  130.986 
Dominican Rep.  178.313  87.792  76.388  61.602 
Egypt 97.777  54.357  54.338  67.708 
El  Salvador  108.852 37.429  137.808 128.684 
Finland  90.520 176.648  133.810 148.505 
France 107.496  104.653  96.943  86.932 
Germany 127.228  125.417  137.067  144.522 
Greece 197.128  117.825  56.349  114.400 
Hungary 122.387  159.674  31.526  49.759 
Iceland  100.322 79.576  165.161 123.765 
India 87.037  296.368  66.705  160.191 
Ireland 107.935  215.324  96.765  90.500 
Israel  74.789 73.810  39.511 105.754 
Italy 127.248  136.410  52.209  73.808 
Jamaica 90.533  54.721  27.196  72.062 
Jordan 55.116  49.882  65.722  95.639 
Korea, Rep  175.708  193.237  212.120  275.319 
Lebanon 207.091  77.630  64.750  46.017 
Luxembourg 112.022  121.848  180.954  23.832 
Malaysia  135.653 78.239  230.074 137.754 
Mexico  76.402 172.329  193.089 145.451 
Namibia 25.429  46.600  29.467  95.938 
Netherlands 127.098  183.132  87.136  103.704 
New  Zealand  87.248 71.927  129.293 67.702 
Nicaragua 62.572  43.186  30.498  27.073 
Norway 84.893  144.364  125.122  94.871 
Peru 131.652  62.610  102.484  99.320 
Portugal 109.420  60.685  81.073  79.673 
Romania 128.197  43.906  48.723  80.452 
South Africa  60.474  124.054  35.687  118.637 
Spain 133.654  222.535  60.740  92.908 
Sweden 87.681  205.840  162.771  89.357 
Switzerland 100.562  175.177  308.331  158.982 
Thailand 83.685  94.384  314.540  155.101 
Trinidad & Tobago  151.001  44.486  61.600  108.886 
Tunisia 53.611  53.125  71.616  83.642 
Turkey 154.354  114.961  54.126  73.552 
UK 127.755  118.877  78.483  84.424 
Uruguay 166.197  96.027  39.182  48.399 
USA 121.813  285.576  194.427  195.410 
Venezuela 30.174  138.801  49.410  97.846 
Yemen 44.559  45.298  12.203  35.142   23
Table 3: Aggregate government efficiency (in administration, stabilization, 






















Inefficient (I) and 
Non-classified (N) 
governments 
Algeria  45.540   (50)  25.908  161.873  I  I 
Argentina (?)  217.404   (1)  16.393  102.426  E  E 
Australia  157.062   (7)  6.896  43.088  E  E 
Austria  114.973   (22)  6.238  38.974  E  E 
Bulgaria  73.985   (43)  28.463  177.836  I  I 
Canada  196.887   (4)  13.791  86.167  E  E 
Chile  127.818   (14)  16.566  103.503  E  E 
Costa Rica  85.260   (38)  20.967  131.001  I  I 
Cyprus  116.086   (21)  21.470  134.141  I  I 
Czech Republic  110.671   (24)  11.807  73.771  E  E 
Denmark  116.208   (20)  7.211  45.058  E  E 
Dominican Rep.  101.024   (28)  23.416  146.299  I  I 
Egypt  68.545   (45)  9.856  61.582  E  N 
El Salvador  103.193   (26)  16.121  100.722  E  N 
Finland  137.371   (11)  7.271  45.429  E  E 
France  99.006   (31)  8.339  52.104  E  E 
Germany  133.560   (13)  6.421  40.122  E  E 
Greece  121.426   (18)  8.067  50.406  E  E 
Hungary  90.837   (35)  14.363  89.738  E  N 
Iceland  117.206   (19)  8.642  53.996  E  E 
India  152.575   (8)  32.056  200.282  I  I 
Ireland  127.631   (15)  4.819  30.111  E  E 
Israel  73.466   (44)  26.017  162.552  I  I 
Italy  97.419   (33)  5.660  35.365  E  E 
Jamaica  61.128   (48)  27.019  168.813  I  I 
Jordan  66.590   (46)  49.992  312.346  I  I 
Korea, Rep.  214.096   (2)  5.802  36.251  E  E 
Lebanon  98.872   (32)  25.788  161.122  I  I 
Luxembourg  109.664   (25)  4.398  27.479  E  E 
Malaysia  145.430   (10)  18.777  117.317  E  E 
Mexico  146.818   (9)  6.630  41.422  E  E 
Namibia  49.359   (49)  38.356  239.646  I  I 
Netherlands  125.268   (17)  9.640  60.232  E  E 
New Zealand  89.043   (36)  8.181  51.117  E  E 
Nicaragua  40.832   (51)  29.834  186.403  I  I 
Norway  112.313   (23)  6.428  40.165  E  E 
Peru  99.017   (30)  12.961  80.981  E  E 
Portugal  82.713   (40)  12.538  78.335  E  N 
Romania  75.319   (42)  14.105  88.125  I  N 
South Africa  84.713   (39)  25.266  157.862  I  I 
Spain  127.459   (16)  6.334  39.574  E  E 
Sweden  136.412   (12)  6.691  41.808  E  E 
Switzerland  185.763   (5)  10.324  64.507  E  E 
Thailand (?)  161.927   (6)  14.118  88.208  E  E 
Trinidad & Tobago  91.493   (34)  14.523  90.743  E  N 
Tunisia  65.498   (47)  11.599  72.468  I  N 
Turkey  99.248   (29)  14.732  92.044  E  N 
UK  102.385   (27)  7.134  44.575  E  E 
Uruguay  87.451   (37)  18.754  117.177  I  I 
USA  199.306   (3)  11.231  70.173  E  E 
Venezuela  79.058   (41)  14.504  90.623  I  N 
Yemen  34.301   (52)  59.847  373.915  I  I   24
Table 4: Aggregate government efficiency (in administration, stabilization and 










(as in Table 3) 
(3) 




Efficient (E), Inefficient (I) 
and Non-classified (N) 
governments 
Algeria  36.386   (50)  161.873  I I 
Argentina (?)  244.32   (1)  102.426  E E 
Australia  168.806   (9)  43.088  E E 
Austria  118.549   (22)  38.974  E E 
Bulgaria  45.128   (49)  177.836  I I 
Canada  224.855   (4)  86.167  E E 
Chile  123.399   (18)  103.503  E E 
Costa Rica  93.263   (30)  131.001  I I 
Cyprus  122.226   (20)  134.141  I N 
Czech Republic  110.271   (23)  73.771  E E 
Denmark  129.677   (15)  45.058  E E 
Dominican Rep.  75.261   (37)  146.299  I I 
Egypt  58.801   (45)  61.582  I N 
El Salvador  101.307   (25)  100.722  E N 
Finland  152.988   (10)  45.429  E E 
France  96.176   (27)  52.104  E E 
Germany  135.670   (13)  40.122  E E 
Greece  96.191   (26)  50.406  E E 
Hungary  80.320   (36)  89.738  I N 
Iceland  122.834   (19)  53.996  E E 
India  174.421   (7)  200.282  I I 
Ireland  134.196   (14)  30.111  E E 
Israel  73.025   (39)  162.552  I I 
Italy  87.476   (34)  35.365  E E 
Jamaica  51.326   (48)  168.813  I I 
Jordan  70.414   (41)  312.346  I I 
Korea, Rep  226.892   (2)  36.251  E E 
Lebanon  62.799   (43)  161.122  I I 
Luxembourg  108.878   (24)  27.479  E E 
Malaysia  148.689   (12)  117.317  E E 
Mexico  170.290   (8)  41.422  E E 
Namibia  57.335   (47)  239.646  I I 
Netherlands  124.658   (17)  60.232  E E 
New Zealand  89.641   (32)  51.117  E E 
Nicaragua  33.586   (51)  186.403  I I 
Norway  121.452   (21)  40.165  E E 
Peru  88.138   (33)  80.981  E N 
Portugal  73.810   (38)  78.335  I N 
Romania  57.694   (46)  88.125  I I 
South Africa  92.793   (31)  157.862  I I 
Spain  125.394   (16)  39.574  E  E 
Sweden  152.656   (11)  41.808  E E 
Switzerland 214.163  (5)  64.507  E E 
Thailand (?)  188.008   (6)  88.208  E E 
Trinidad & Tobago  71.657   (40)  90.743  I I 
Tunisia  69.461   (42)  72.468  I N 
Turkey  80.880   (35)  92.044  I N 
UK  93.928   (29)  44.575  E E 
Uruguay  61.203   (44)  117.177  I I 
USA  225.137   (3)  70.173  E E 
Venezuela  95.353   (28)  90.623  E N 
Yemen  30.881   (52)  373.915  I  I   25
Table 5: The effects of the size and efficiency of government on anti-social activities 














gov. share in GDP  







gov. share in GDP 
 (inefficient govs, I)  
-0.221** 
(0.084) 
gov. share in GDP 







gov. share in GDP 











gov. share in GDP 












(inefficient govs, I) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
        gov. efficiency (non-
classified govs, N) 
-0.143* 
(0.083) 
        gov. efficiency (efficient 
govs, E)  
0.005 
(0.010) 






democracy (Gastil)  2.129*** 
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constant  35.956*** 
(3.651) 
R
2  76.69%  76.26%  76.62%  R
2  78.04% 
Observations  162  162  153  Observations  162 
Notes: (i) See the notes in Table 1. (ii) In columns (1)-(3), efficient (inefficient) governments are those whose relative 
size is smaller (larger) than relative efficiency. In column (4), efficient, inefficient and non-classified governments are 
as defined in the text.     26
Table 6: The effects of the size and efficiency of government on anti-social activities 
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2  77.92% 78.28%  R
2  77.96% 78.63% 
Observations  162 153  Observations  162 153 
Notes: (i) See the notes in Table 1. (ii) In columns (1) and (2), efficient (inefficient) governments are those whose 
relative size is smaller (larger) than relative efficiency. In columns (3) and (4), efficient, inefficient and non-classified 
governments are as defined in the text.   
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